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Chapter 252 min read

Volition: How the Invisible Becomes Action

In the previous chapter we spoke of man as a social animal who made up for his physical weakness with the ability to cooperate. Life with others gave him enormous advantages, but it required him to subordinate his desires to common interests.

Picture a hunter who has returned with his kill. He is hungry and tired, and he could eat most of the meat himself. But in the community the kill is shared: part will go to the children, and part to those who stayed behind at the camp today.

Sharing is not to the hungry hunter's advantage. But another time he himself will come back empty-handed, and then he will be fed by whoever was lucky. The ability to give up today's gain for tomorrow's help becomes a condition of survival.

Here a conflict arises. Early man feels a desire that comes from his body. And at the same time he acts for the sake of an ephemeral result that exists only in his imagination. What is more, the event for which he gives up his desire depends on other people and will come at some point in the future.

What makes him act this way?

Willpower. That is what we call the ability to restrain impulses and pursue a goal. But how well do we understand this ability itself?

Why are some desires almost impossible to resist, while others, perfectly reasonable, go unfulfilled for years? Where does the very idea of what one ought to want come from? And how freely does a person make decisions whose causes he often does not know himself? We need to sort this out, because a person deals with his own "volition" in faith, in trust, in advertising, and in religion alike.

A person can spend his life on a result that exists only in his imagination. He builds a temple for the salvation of his soul and gives away his property for the sake of a promised reward. He fasts, keeps kashrut and taboos, takes vows for the sake of a future he accepts on faith.

How does the invisible gain power over the entirely material human body?

The Body

Let us begin at the beginning — with movement.

A living creature learns about the world by exchanging signals with it. Light enters the eye, a sound wave reaches the ear, the hand meets the resistance of an object. An organism always reacts. Every contact with the world is built as the sending and receiving of a message, and both operations require movement to be carried out.

A living body cannot stop. A person deprived of mobility for a long time develops bedsores, his muscles weaken, and without outside care he dies. Rest is possible only under the watch of other people, who move in his place. Nikolai Bernstein spoke of this more broadly, having in mind the equilibrium of an organism with its environment: "Equilibrium for a living system is equivalent to death" [31, essay 11, pp. 410–430].

On this observation the neurophysiologist Rodolfo Llinás built his theory of the brain. In his account, the nervous system arose in creatures that need to move about actively, and serves above all to predict the consequences of movement. He shows this with the sea squirt. The sea squirt larva swims and has the rudiment of a brain. Having found a suitable place, it attaches itself to a rock and digests most of its own nervous system: an immobile organism no longer needs it [32, pp. 15–17].

Llinás states his conclusion this way: "I repeat what I have said from the start: that which we call thinking is the evolutionary internalization of movement" [32, p. 35]. Thinking, in this formula, is movement integrated inside the organism: the brain plays out an action in advance, before the body performs it.

The action itself is set off by emotion. Llinás describes emotions as premotor states: fear or anger arise before movement and give it a push [32, pp. 155–156]. We will understand desire in the same way: as an inner state that precedes movement and gives it direction.

Between emotion and movement Llinás places intention — the choice of what to do, made before the action itself [32, pp. 227–228]. This is how he separates volitional choice from reflex: one can choose in a situation where several movements are possible but only one will be carried out [32, p. 148].

Bernstein, who studied how movements are constructed, described the living organism as a system that sets its own motor tasks. In his "physiology of activity," movement is guided by a model of the required future, that is, an image of a result that does not yet exist [31, essays 11 and 12, pp. 410–449].

Hence the first support of our argument. Before speaking of will as conscious effort, we should see its foundation in the motor activity of the living creature: it acts outward, receives a response, and acts again. A living creature is bound by nature to move, and will begins where this movement acquires a choice.

A living organism is forced to sustain its existence, and for this it needs food and warmth. When they are lacking, its inner state changes and pushes it to act. Hunger makes it search for food, pain makes it pull its hand away.

Philosophers came to this idea long ago. Thomas Hobbes in "Leviathan" derived desire directly from motion. The smallest beginnings of motion within the body, not yet visible from outside, he called endeavor, conatus (Latin). An endeavor directed toward an object Hobbes considered desire, and will was the last desire, the one in which deliberation ends. There is no rest in this picture of the world: life itself, according to Hobbes, is motion, and without desire it is impossible [40, ch. VI].

Spinoza used the word conatus for the striving of a thing to preserve its existence. In his understanding this is a fundamental property of everything that exists, and for a living creature it is the basis of its activity [3]. What interests us is the very framing of the question: the origin of will should be sought in the ability of a living organism to sustain its existence and to actively change its relations with its environment.

Evolution taught animals to choose actions by their expected consequences. An animal remembers what preceded food and tries to repeat it. One can move toward a goal without conscious reasoning.

A cat waits for its prey for a long time, shifts the position of its body, and picks its moment to pounce. All its behavior is subordinated to a future result. But we have no grounds to think that the cat formulates an intention in advance, as a human does. The purposeful behavior of living creatures is made up, for the most part, of innate mechanisms and personal experience.

Vladimir Romanov proposes to view the surrounding world through the possibilities it offers the body [30, pp. 96–97].

A bird alights on a branch; for it, this is a place to be. A person will pick up the same branch and make a staff of it, or a handle for an axe. What a thing means depends on the structure of the body and the actions available to it.

Romanov shows this with a child [30, p. 101]. A child's world grows along with his mobility. While he lies still, objects are available only to the eye. Once he starts crawling, he reaches them. Having learned to grasp and turn things over, he finds out what can be done with them.

Take an ordinary chair. A child masters it first of all with his body: he learns to take a certain posture, to distribute his weight, to relate his own movements to the structure of the object. In time he forms a practical understanding of what a chair is (a chair, meanwhile, means nothing to a dog). This understanding appears before the child learns to give the object a verbal definition [30, pp. 102–103].

The meaning of a thing is formed first in a person's activity, even before he begins to reason about it consciously. The surrounding world exists for a living creature as a space of possibilities.

This is where we propose to begin the conversation about will. The organism knew how to strive toward a result long before man learned to formulate desires in words and to build abstract ideas of the future.

And more than that: man learned to desire what he has never experienced before and what simply does not yet exist.

Movement as a Given

Life is the unfolding of our movement in the world. Movement itself is given to us before any decision, its stopping means death, and all we can choose is its direction. We will show this on three levels: entropy, time, and the very structure of the Universe.

The first level begins with the definition of the living. The physicist Erwin Schrödinger, in his lectures "What Is Life?" delivered in Dublin in 1943, asked when we call a piece of matter alive, and answered: as long as it goes on "doing something," moving, exchanging material with its environment. In a nonliving system all motion soon comes to a stop, and it turns into a "dead, inert lump of matter" [33, pp. 121–122].

The nonliving environment, according to the second law of thermodynamics, moves toward disorder, while life goes in a different direction: it lowers entropy within itself and pays for this by increasing entropy around it. In Bernstein's words: "the activity of an organism is biophysically a struggle for negentropy" [31, conclusion, pp. 450–462].

Schrödinger expresses the same thought this way: an organism maintains its own orderliness by drawing order from its environment and, in his phrase, feeds on negative entropy [33, pp. 124, 127–128].

Man has gone further in this than any living creature known to us. He builds dwellings, lays roads, reshapes the landscape to suit himself, and so extends the area of the world under his control. Bernstein saw in this a general property of movement: the organism acts on the world, "changing it in the respect it needs" [31, essay 12, pp. 431–449]. In the first chapter we called this adaptivity. Desire is the form in which man experiences the constant work against disintegration. We want because the living must act in order to remain alive.

The second level is time. The fastest channel through which we receive information about the world is sight, and light travels at a limiting speed that is the same for all observers. From the theory of relativity it follows that simultaneity depends on the observer: what for one is still to come, for another, moving relative to him, is happening now. From this the philosopher Hilary Putnam, in a 1967 article, concluded that future events are just as real as present ones, and that statements about them are already true or false [34, pp. 242–247]. He declared the question of the reality and determinateness of the future settled, and settled "by physics and not by philosophy": we live in a four-dimensional world, where space and time form a single continuum [34, p. 247]. Everything in such a world seems predetermined, and of all time, all that falls to a person is one thing: the action he performs now.

The third level is the very structure of the Universe. To speak of it, we will need the theory of the potential text of culture proposed by Vladimir Romanov. Above we said that a thing becomes for a person an externalized possibility of action: a chair presupposes in advance that someone will sit on it [30, pp. 102–103]. The sign-and-symbol system of information exchange among people, words, works the same way. Romanov calls the key concepts of a culture its thesaurus, and the whole system of connections between them an unmanifested, potential text, in which concepts in advance "expect" and "presuppose" one another with varying degrees of probability [30, p. 118]. Once one of them is sounded, the whole system responds: on this depends which mental move will be made next.

The potential text exists as a set of possible continuations, and every phrase spoken, every act performed realizes one of them. A thought that has taken place, according to Romanov, arises when the mind overcomes an enormous number of its degrees of freedom and "freezes out" part of these connections [30, p. 124]. What a culture is able to "see" in the world at all depends on the potential text, and Romanov calls it the most important internal motivational factor [30, p. 122]. A person can want what is in the potential text of his culture.

The potential text of culture is needed here because it arises out of movement. As the body unfolds its movement, it forms first the surrounding world and then the world of objects. From actions with things comes a system of information exchange, and around it culture, society, and the very capacity for knowledge take shape. The world becomes a "text" that we read all our lives, and this text depends directly on us and on our body. Each movement performed leaves in it the possibility of the next. Movement is given to us before any decision, and the potential text shows where it can go next, that is, from what we choose a direction.

In 1974 Brandon Carter formulated the "anthropic principle": what we can expect to observe is limited by the conditions necessary for our presence as observers [35, p. 291]. The physical constants lie in a range compatible with our existence. Were the strong interaction a little weaker, hydrogen would be the only element; were gravity stronger, planets would not form, and so there would be no observers, you and I [35, pp. 297–298].

The laws of nature and the physical constants form the thesaurus of the Universe, and the connections between them its potential text, in which some events in advance expect and presuppose others. From the given constants stars are born, from stars carbon, from carbon the living cell, and after it the one who looks at all this. The observer is expected in this text from the very beginning. We discover the laws of the world and read them as the potential text of the Universe. The potential text of culture continues it on a human scale.

This text was written before us, the future in it is as real as the present, and everything seems predetermined. But we cannot help acting: the potential text unfolds only through the one who makes a move, and making moves is what it means to live. The space of possible moves is predetermined; the move itself remains with the person.

Let us put it together. The living must move and extend the ordered world; it can act only in the present, and every action realizes one of the continuations laid down in the text of the Universe. This means that action outward is itself given to a person before any choice: he cannot refuse it. Choice appears later, together with a nervous system that, according to Llinás, plays out movement in advance [32, pp. 21–24]. A movement that can be imagined before it is performed can be directed. We call volition the inevitable action plus the choice of its direction. Desire is the inner state and the source of choice.

If volition is inherent in every person, and people are bound together by the exchange of information, then humanity as a whole is a very old distributed system that reads the text of the Universe and passes what it has read down the generations. Against this background, artificial intelligence looks like a natural stage of evolution.

And now let us ask how human desire is structured.

Need and Desire

Let us try to tell need from desire.

An organism runs short of food. A state arises that drives it to look for something to eat. Yet the object of a particular human desire may turn out to be a specific dish, prepared by a specific person, in a specific place.

Hunger itself explains nothing about why we prefer one cuisine to another and are ready to save for months for a dinner at a famous Michelin-starred restaurant. Personal experience is responsible for that. We remember familiar tastes, link food with events we have lived through, and learn about new dishes from those around us.

Need sets desire going, but what exactly we will want is determined by our experience. The psychologist Alexei Leontiev wrote that before its first satisfaction a need "does not know" its object: the object "still has to be discovered" [7, ch. V, § 4].

Lack is not always the cause of desire: it arises even where a person has everything he needs.

Imagine a person who has never heard of a certain model of car. He lives quite calmly without it until one day he learns that it exists. After a while this car becomes the object of his strongest desire.

What happened? The car may have turned out to be a new way of satisfying an existing need, for example the need to get around. Or it acquired a meaning for him tied to an idea of success and of the desirable image of his own life. In the second case the thing became valuable thanks to an additional, superexistential meaning that the person began to attach to it.

How this works in the psyche.

Neurobiology describes motivation through the systems of reward and learning. Meet dopamine, the protagonist of this story.

In popular literature it is often called the essence of pleasure. However, the research of Kent Berridge and Terry Robinson shows that striving to obtain a reward and enjoying it once obtained are provided by different, though related, neural mechanisms. The authors themselves put it this way: "Usually a brain 'likes' the rewards that it 'wants'. But sometimes it may just 'want' them" [10, section "Wanting"].

A person can want an object very much even after it has stopped giving him its former pleasure. This is especially noticeable in addictions, when the urge to repeat an action persists and even grows as its pleasantness declines. The psychiatrist Anna Lembke shows in her book "Dopamine Nation" that the chief condition of addiction is the very availability of powerful stimuli [9]. In her talks she calls this the paradox of abundance: a brain formed in ancient conditions has found itself in an environment oversaturated with dopamine stimuli, and abundance itself turns into stress for it [43, slide 19].

What matters to us is the difference itself between desire and pleasure. If a person keeps wanting what has already stopped bringing him joy, then his behavior cannot be explained by a conscious pursuit of pleasant experiences alone. Motivation has a dynamic of its own.

Wolfram Schultz's research shows that dopamine neurons respond to the difference between the reward received and the reward expected. A reward larger than expected produces a burst of their activity, a reward smaller than expected produces a dip, and to a reward that matches the expectation exactly they do not respond at all. By this signal the organism learns to predict significant events [11, pp. 25–26].

From this mechanism Schultz draws a conclusion familiar to everyone. A reward once received at once becomes the norm, and the next time the same reward no longer produces a burst. To get the former response, a bigger reward is needed each time. He compares dopamine neurons to "little devils" in the brain that drive us toward ever greater rewards. His example is the same as ours, a car: we want a different car because we have grown used to the current one, and the neurons' response will be triggered only by a better one, or at least a new one [11, p. 29]. That is why advertising always promises something new: by the very design of the brain, the familiar stops stirring us.

The organism acquires expectations about a future result. An object becomes desirable thanks to past experience. And it remains desirable even when there is less benefit and pleasure in it.

Berridge adds a detail to this that matters for advertising. The very sign that predicts a reward also becomes desirable. Rats were shown a lever before food, and some of them began to sniff and gnaw the lever as though trying to eat it. The authors call such a sign a "motivational magnet": it draws us to itself and kindles the desire to get what stands behind it. For a person it is enough to imagine this sign vividly [10, section "Wanting"]. A logo and an advertising image work as such signs: on seeing or recalling them, we begin to want before we have time to think whether we need the object of desire itself.

But if a considerable part of our motivation is determined by mechanisms that we do not consciously choose, where in this construction is the will?

Who Makes the Decision

Philosophers have tried to answer this question for thousands of years.

Aristotle distinguished desire from conscious choice. A person can desire immortality, though it is unattainable. But a decision to act presupposes an idea of the means by which one can approach the goal [1, bk. III, ch. 4]. For Aristotle the main thing here is the ability to reason about possible actions.

In the eighth book of the "Confessions," Augustine describes a state of inner division, in which a person wants to change his own life and at the same time resists that change [2, bk. VIII, ch. 5, 9–10].

This experience is familiar to everyone. One can understand perfectly well that one needs to quit smoking and still go on smoking. One can decide to take up sports and put off the first workout for months. In both cases the person is aware of the desirable result, but knowing about it turns out not to be enough for action.

Kant drew a boundary that we will still need. As long as a person is moved by the object of his desire, that object sets the rule for the act: I do one thing because I want another. Kant calls such a will dependent. He considers free the will that sets a rule for itself and follows it even when desire pulls the other way; this is what he calls the autonomy of the will [4, sec. II]. For our argument it follows that wanting and deciding are different capacities. Desire comes to a person from the body, from habit, from another's word, but the rule he sets for himself. Schopenhauer, by contrast, proposed to regard the will as a deep-lying principle, in relation to which the intellect occupies a secondary position [5, bk. II, §§ 21, 27].

Philosophical ideas about free will took shape long before experimental psychology appeared. And experimental psychology forced us to revise our ideas about how a person makes decisions.

Daniel Kahneman, together with Amos Tversky, studied how people judge things they do not know for certain [12, pt. II, pp. 145–260].

It turned out that even in simple tasks people make mistakes, and the same mistakes recur across many subjects.

We are used to thinking that we weigh the circumstances and choose the most advantageous decision. But the choice depends on how the problem is presented, on what we happened to recall, and on what the first impression was.

In the book "Thinking, Fast and Slow," Kahneman described two conventional systems of thinking [12, ch. 1, pp. 29–43].

System 1 works fast and mostly automatically. It recognizes familiar objects and instantly produces intuitive judgments.

System 2 is connected with conscious attention. We switch it on when we do arithmetic in our heads or check someone else's argument.

This is a conventional model. In the human brain there are no two separate organs among which all mental operations are divided. It helps us understand an important feature of our psyche. Most everyday decisions we make almost without thinking, and we are far from always willing to take on the labor of checking our first impression.

Let us look at some familiar examples.

After hearing about several plane crashes, a person begins to consider flying extremely dangerous, although the statistical probability of such an event remains low. Vivid cases come to mind easily and affect the assessment of risk. Kahneman and Tversky called this the availability heuristic [12, ch. 12–13, pp. 172–193].

In another case the first price named becomes an anchor for judging subsequent offers. Even if a person understands that the initial figure is arbitrary, it influences his judgment. This is the anchoring effect [12, ch. 11, pp. 159–171].

And now imagine that one and the same outcome is described in two ways. In the classic problem of Tversky and Kahneman, a disease threatens 600 people. The program that "will save 200 people" was chosen by 72 percent of participants. The same program worded as "400 people will die" was chosen by only 22 percent [12, ch. 34, pp. 474–492; app. B, pp. 572–596]. The mathematical consequences are the same, yet the preferences change. This is what the framing effect looks like.

A person is sure that he chooses on the basis of the objective properties of the options under consideration. But his preferences change following the form in which one and the same piece of information is presented.

What, then, does free exercise of the will mean? If a decision depends on a wording picked at random, how much control does a person have over his own choice?

Still, it would be a mistake to think that Kahneman refuted the existence of the will. His research shows the limits of our conscious control and the capacity of the psyche to err systematically. It does not yet follow that a person is deprived of the possibility of revising his decisions.

What is more, fast ways of thinking are useful. Gerd Gigerenzer draws attention to the fact that heuristics are often effective ways of acting when information is lacking. In some conditions a simple rule makes it possible to get a result faster and more reliably than a complex analysis [16, pp. 453–454, 457].

Here is an example from marketing. A retailer needs to understand which customers will still come back to buy. Experienced marketers use one rule: a customer who has bought nothing for nine months is considered gone. This rule was compared with a complex statistical model that took into account the entire purchase history of each customer. For an apparel retailer the rule correctly identified 83 percent of customers, the model 75; for an airline, 77 against 74 [16, p. 455]. The model knew more and calculated longer, yet erred more often.

For ancient man this was especially necessary. On meeting an unfamiliar beast, it is more useful to assume danger at once than to try to find out whether it intends to attack. A mistake cost a little lost time; hesitation could cost a life.

Many features of our thinking are worth viewing in just this way. What helps us get our bearings in the world quickly produces errors in tasks where one needs to reason differently.

We left the hunter facing a choice and will return to him. But first we need to understand where the invisible causes and witnesses in his world come from. Without them we cannot explain why a given word will prove stronger than hunger.

Why People See What Isn't There

Our brain constantly tries to predict what is happening. A person notices the signs of approaching rain, recognizes danger from the behavior of animals, connects his actions with what followed them. Without this ability he would not have survived.

But the world around us is full of chance.

Suppose a hunter walked around the fire to the left before setting out, and came back with game. The next time he did the same, and the hunt succeeded again. It could have been a coincidence, but a person is inclined to see cause and effect here. A few more successful hunts, and the conviction grows stronger.

This is where the mechanisms we now call cognitive biases come in. A person remembers better the cases that confirm his guess, while failures he forgets or explains away separately.

The need to find a pattern grows when the outcome is unclear. In 2008 Jennifer Whitson and Adam Galinsky showed that the less a person feels in control of what is happening, the more often he sees patterns where there are none [18, pp. 115–117]. In one experiment people were shown pictures of static, like the screen of an untuned television, and half of the pictures contained nothing but noise. Those who had first been deprived of the sense of control found an image on five of the twelve empty pictures on average; the others found one on three and a half. In another experiment, people who were asked to recall a time when nothing depended on them were more willing to believe that knocking on wood before a meeting helped an idea get through [18, p. 116].

Bronislaw Malinowski observed this in the Trobriand Islands. In the lagoon fish were poisoned: a simple and effective method with a predictable result. Here the islanders did without magic. When they went out into the open sea, where the catch is unpredictable and a boat may not come back, they accompanied the fishing with an elaborate magical ritual [17, sec. II].

From this we can see where magical ideas begin: with the ordinary human ability to look for explanations.

Our ancestor watches nature, notices recurring events, and tries to understand which actions will lead to the desired result. He knows nothing of probability or statistical testing, and judges by a few cases.

But one can learn about the world without scientific apparatus. Every day a person has to decide where to look for game, when to set out, how to protect himself from disease. These are quite material questions, and if he assumes an invisible causal link, he acts on the basis of it.

Let us call this activity proto-science: knowledge without a procedure of proof. A person moves toward the edge of the known, runs into something he cannot yet explain, and tries to come to terms with the unknown in order to go on acting.

We propose to distinguish several phenomena that researchers later united under the word "magic". There were practices that survived through the repetition of actions and received explanations only later, within a particular cultural tradition. Some ideas were tied to the observation of natural regularities, others to the supposed influence of invisible forces.

The very concept of magic took shape historically, and its boundaries in anthropology and religious studies have shifted. So to look in primitive times for a ready-made system of magical thinking would be an oversimplification. But we can study the psychological preconditions of the actions that were later called magical.

The chief of these preconditions is already familiar to us: the habit of seeing a cause where there may be none. It is easy to calculate why it took hold. A person hears a rustle in the bushes. In 95 cases out of 100 it is the wind, in 5 it is a predator. Running costs a little energy, and meeting a predator costs a life. The one who runs from every rustle is wrong 95 times out of 100 and still comes out ahead of the one who doesn't believe the rustle. The biologists Kevin Foster and Hanna Kokko showed this with a model: selection favors the habit of connecting events by a cause whenever a rare correct guess pays for a multitude of false ones. The authors themselves compare this condition with Pascal's wager, the famous argument for belief in God: believing is advantageous even if the probability of His existence is small, because the winnings from a correct bet are very large [44, p. 33]. Their conclusion: superstitious behavior is an inevitable feature of adapted behavior in all organisms, humans included [44, p. 31].

And here we draw the next conclusion:

A mistaken hypothesis also spurs action. A person assumes that a deed will lead to a result, performs it, looks at what came of it, and gains new experience.

Sometimes the action turns out to be useless or leads to a result for an entirely different reason. And sometimes a randomly chosen practice really does work.

Magical thinking made people try more different actions, and some of those trials turned out to be useful.

Magic as a Tool of Random Choice

Imagine hunters who have to decide in which direction to set out for game.

They know the places and have come back with game more than once. But the animal moves on, and where the hunt succeeded yesterday there may be nothing today. The hunters can take the familiar route, though sometimes it pays to search somewhere else.

Now imagine that the direction of the hunt is chosen by divination. The hunters themselves believe that the spirits give them the answer, but the procedure works as a generator of random choice.

Hence a question that seems paradoxical at first: could a magical practice have been useful precisely because it made people's behavior random?

This idea has already been voiced in anthropology. In 1957 Omar Khayyam Moore analyzed the divination of the Naskapi hunters in Labrador: a caribou shoulder blade was heated, and the cracks were used to determine where to go for game. Moore suggested that this was "a very crude way of randomizing human behavior under conditions where avoiding fixed patterns of activity may be an advantage" (quoted in [23, p. 2]). His guess about the caribou was not confirmed, but the idea itself outlived the example: today a whole field stands on it, studying how useful practices take shape without design and without understanding [23, pp. 4–5].

For our chapter this is crucial: people keep a practice because they believe in one explanation, while it works for an entirely different reason.

Studies of animal behavior give one more example. In 2014 a group of scientists, including Colin Camerer and Tetsuro Matsuzawa, had chimpanzees play against each other. In these experiments the apes chose their moves with a frequency very close to the one that game theory predicts for equilibrium [24, pp. 2–3]. They played more accurately than humans given the same game: the chimpanzees' deviation from the calculated value turned out to be several times smaller [24, p. 3].

A Nash equilibrium is a position in which it is not advantageous for any player to change his strategy as long as the others do not change theirs. In some games it is reached only by a mixed strategy: the player alternates his moves randomly, in a set proportion. Randomness is useful here because the opponent cannot guess the next move.

The experiment with the chimpanzees shows that behavior close to a mathematically optimal strategy can take shape without any knowledge of the theory.

Let us return to divination. If random choice sometimes brings benefit, people will keep the practice that supplies it, and at the same time will not understand why it works. This is how a culture selects useful actions together with mistaken explanations.

In this sense magic was needed by people above all as a way of coping with uncertainty, which is characteristic of the nature of human will.

Will in the Face of the Unknown

A person constantly runs into what he cannot predict. A natural disaster, an illness, a dangerous hunt, the death of someone close take away his feeling that he is in charge of his own life.

Faced with them, a person looks for a cause. The human body itself switches on that search. The brain, as we have already said, exists for movement, and in order to move, one must know in advance what will follow each action [32, pp. 21–24]. If I step on this stone, it will hold. If I throw the spear like this, I will hit. Each such "I'll do it and get it" is a small piece of knowledge about a cause. As long as everything goes according to expectations, we do not notice this inner work. But as soon as the world answers differently — the stone slides under the foot, the animal gets away, the child falls ill — the brain gives off an error signal, the very one Schultz wrote about [11, pp. 25–26]. It urgently needs a new connection: what went wrong and what to do next. And it cannot wait, because the body cannot stop moving.

When the cause is known, one can act on it. An unknown cause a person builds out for himself from what he already knows, that is, from the potential text of his culture.

In 2014 Cristine Legare and André Souza tested how a sense of randomness affects the evaluation of rituals. In experiments in Brazil and the United States, participants whose sense of randomness was heightened considered rituals more effective [20, pp. 156–157]. The participants were asked to evaluate Brazilian "simpatias", home rituals against illness and misfortune. Here is one of them: give the sick person coconut milk to drink, ask him to spit three times into the coconut, seal the opening with the wax of a new white candle, and carry the coconut to a distant shore. The authors note that such rituals have many steps and repetitions, like procedures that really do work [20, p. 154].

Whitson's experiments, Malinowski's observations and the Brazilian rituals agree that people need magic where they do not control the circumstances.

But why is it so important for a person to do something, anything? The reason lies in where we began the chapter. A living organism exists as long as it acts, and inaction in the face of a threat is unbearable for it.

Waiting for trouble demands constant tension. A meaningful action relieves it, even when it hardly affects the outcome.

In the first chapter we called cultic activity the shock absorber of the psyche, because a repeated action gives a person back a sense of predictability. Studies of rituals confirm this. A rite calms, helps keep sight of a goal, and binds people to one another [27, p. 263].

The benefit of a ritual for the psyche and its ability to change circumstances are, in essence, different questions. After a rite the person feels better, although the probability of the desired event has stayed the same. But the feeling has come back to him that he is in charge of what is happening, and he can go on acting.

This is one more feature of volition. A person has to act before he finds out what the action will lead to. Out of this necessity to choose blind grew the ideas of invisible forces and causal links.

But a personal experience alone is not enough for a lasting tradition to grow out of it. Ideas must pass from person to person and be reproduced from generation to generation.

Here we need Romanov again.

Culture Thinks for Us

In "Cultural-Historical Anthropology" Romanov writes that a person receives his ideas about the world within his culture [6].

From earliest childhood he masters things and the rules for handling them, watches adults and adopts the accepted ways of acting. Most of this experience is never explained to him in words.

Romanov distinguishes the sympractic and the theoretical types of culture [30, pp. 110, 119–120]. In the first, experience is passed on directly in the doing, and a person adopts a way of behaving by taking part in what is done around him. In the second, activity begins to be described in words, general norms are derived from it, and people begin to look at their own behavior from the outside.

What interests Romanov is how a person learned to think beyond the situation in which he acts.

We usually think that a person first decides and then acts. Culture is arranged differently.

A child learns an action by repeating it after adults. This is how his habits and his sense of the right order of things take shape. He will begin to explain his actions later, and in the words that the same culture gives him. Action precedes its understanding.

Let us apply this thought to ritual. A person takes part in it long before he can explain its meaning. He remembers the order of actions and the place of each participant, and along with them takes on the experience of his ancestors. In this sense a ritual is a special way a culture exists.

And again let us turn to the potential text of culture. The concepts a person thinks with are linked to one another by expectations that he himself does not notice [30, pp. 118–119].

Some concepts, as we have said, "expect" and "presuppose" others in advance. Name one, and the next ones are already at hand. On these links depends which thoughts seem natural in a given culture.

A person finds himself inside the potential text of culture long before he can make sense of its structure. That is why he thinks, in part, by rules he did not choose.

Kahneman's observations agree with this: a significant share of mental operations runs automatically and leads to systematic errors. Romanov shows where the very content of these operations comes from: from culture.

A person can connect events with one another by nature, and does it quickly. But which connections will seem natural to him depends on the experience he received in a culture.

Imagine a person who has never heard of sin. He knows the fear of punishment and the feeling of guilt. But he can come to want to atone for sin only within a tradition where sin is understood as a special state that is lifted by prescribed actions. Having absorbed this idea, he acquires a new object of desire.

If culture determines which goals a person can even imagine, how independently does he choose his own desires? Romanov answers directly: "the freedom of our volition is always limited by the unconditional circumstance that we are initially forced to self-determine concretely in a world of universally valid verbal concepts that had already come to be before us and apart from us" [30, p. 117].

Volition exists inside a space of possibilities, and most of it took shape long before a person was born. But culture also expands this space: with new concepts and occupations a new future appears that can be imagined. A person begins to strive for what has never been in his experience.

How Intention Arises

Let us return to the hunter with whom we began the chapter.

He is hungry and wants to eat. But he knows that part of the catch must be given to others. Two impulses collide in him. Hunger demands its due now, while the obligation to the community reminds him of tomorrow.

Which of them will determine the deed? We usually say that a person must show willpower, but these words explain little. What exactly happens when he refuses the food he is holding in his hands?

The psychology of motivation answers through the concepts of need, motive, and goal. We will need the work of Alexei Leontiev and Sergei Rubinstein.

According to Leontiev, human activity is always directed at an object. A need finds its object in the encounter with the world, and this object becomes the motive, that is, that for the sake of which a person acts [7, ch. III, § 2; ch. V, § 4].

Rubinstein divides the act of will into four stages: impulse and the setting of a goal, the struggle of motives, decision, execution. He considers the first and the last to be the main ones, that is, a clear goal and persistence in achieving it. Desire appears together with the goal and "presupposes a certain experience by which a person learns what object is able to satisfy his need." It is still far from action, because the imagination "adorns the desired object," and the person drifts into daydreams. "To wish is not yet to want." By wanting, Rubinstein means readiness to act for the sake of a goal and to master the means necessary for it [8, ch. XIV, section "The Course of the Volitional Process"].

But even a conscious desire is not yet an intention. A person can sincerely wish to start a new life on Monday and do nothing at all.

The American philosopher Michael Bratman described intention as a special state that organizes future behavior. Having formed an intention, a person builds plans around it and does not lose the goal over time [25, ch. 1, secs. 1.1–1.2].

This is how intention differs from desire. Desire comes and goes with circumstances, while intention goes on shaping behavior even when the original impulse has weakened [25, ch. 2, sec. 2.2]. That is why a person works on a difficult project even on the days when he has no wish at all to do it.

But how can an intention be made stable? The psychologist Peter Gollwitzer showed that a goal is reached more often when a person ties the needed action in advance to a specific situation [26, pp. 494–496]. The decision to "move more" works worse than the intention to go for a run at seven in the morning on Tuesdays and Fridays. In one experiment, students before the Christmas break were asked what difficult task they planned to accomplish during it: write a paper for a seminar, settle a family quarrel, take up sports. Two thirds of those who had decided in advance when and where they would start on it succeeded, and only a quarter of the others [26, p. 495].

A conscious decision can work even without the participation of consciousness. A person arranges circumstances in advance so that the needed action later proceeds almost automatically. According to Gollwitzer, a plan hands control of the action over to a situation chosen in advance, and when that situation arrives, the action starts by itself [26, p. 493].

This changes our idea of willpower. It also shows itself in arranging one's future behavior once and not deciding anew each time.

A person has another possibility as well. He can hand the management of his behavior over to the rules of the community.

The Promise as an Instrument of the Will

Imagine a person who decides to give up a certain pleasure. As long as this remains his personal intention, he can change his mind at any moment.

The situation changes when a person makes a promise to other people. Now his future behavior is tied to the expectations of those around him. If he betrays their expectations, he will lose their trust and his place in the group. An additional reason appears to hold to the decision he has made.

In the first chapter we said that life together requires trust. A person earns it in exactly this way: he tells his kin in advance how he will act, and they gain the right to hold him to account.

In a primeval community, a given word has witnesses besides one's kin: the dead ancestors, the spirit of the slain animal. They are always near and see what is hidden from one's kin. That is why a person keeps the rule even when no human being sees him.

Now it is clear why the hungry hunter shares the catch. He committed himself to share it long before this hunt, before his kin and before his ancestors. Today hunger demands that he eat the meat himself, but the decision has already been made, and all that remains for the hunter is to carry it out. What we call willpower turns out here to be a promise given in advance. We defined volition as the choice of direction, and a promise is that same choice, made in advance and before witnesses.

In time the place of ancestors and spirits will be taken by gods, and a word given before them will become an oath and a vow, and later a pledge and a contract. The structure will remain the same: there is a witness from whom one cannot hide.

This acquisition has a price. He who has given his word is no longer free to act tomorrow as he pleases. In the first chapter we said that culture grows out of the limitation of freedom; now we can see how this happens. Romanov wrote that the freedom of our volition is always limited by the world of common concepts, which took shape before us and without us [30, p. 117]. In gaining cohesion, people lost the freedom of their volition. They sacrificed it for the sake of culture and future well-being.

In time the sacrifice ceases to be felt: following generations take the rule for the natural order of things. A rule learned in childhood is carried out without choice, as quickly and habitually as those decisions Kahneman wrote about. Here his question about free will receives an answer from an unexpected side: automatism turns out to be the trace of a decision once made. People bound themselves with a word once, and from then on the word acts for them.

It is such obligations that make up the potential text of culture. Each link in it, from "I swear" to "I will fulfill," is a freedom that people once gave up for the sake of the community's well-being. As long as they go on sacrificing it, culture exists.

Ritual fixes the obligation through repetition: it helps a person follow the rule and sustains the significance of the goal for the sake of which the rule was adopted [27, pp. 267–269]. This is how personal intentions become shared, and after them desires become shared too.

When Desire Becomes Shared

A person can imagine a result that does not yet exist. But the most significant things in culture were created where such an image could be shared with others. In the first chapter we said that society is able to want what not one of its members wants. Let us see how this comes about.

A large structure is raised by hundreds of people. Each does a small part of the work and checks it against the image of the whole, and may never see the finished building.

The Sagrada Família in Barcelona has been under construction since 1882. Antoni Gaudí took charge of the work a year later and led it until his death in 1926; he is buried in the crypt of the church. The main tower was completed in 2026, a hundred years after his death, and the Glory facade will be built for at least another ten years [45]. The church is being built by people who never knew its author, according to the design he left behind.

What keeps such work from falling apart over a hundred years? The same three conditions we spoke of in the first chapter: information, value, and trust. The builders must know the design, cherish the common goal, and count on the others to do their part.

Culture provides all three conditions. Language describes the future result, shared ideas give it worth, and rules coordinate people's actions in time.

The first stable forms of such organization were created by cultic activity. Göbekli Tepe was built by hunter-gatherers more than eleven thousand years ago, long before writing, states, and religions in the sense familiar to us. This means that the capacity to give shared significance to ideas about the invisible is older than religious institutions, which received it ready-made and built their forms upon it. How people acquired this capacity is what we have yet to work out.

It begins with trust in what a person has learned from others. In the first chapter we said that most of our knowledge of the world comes from other people's words.

Let us look at this through the eyes of the one who acts. A person presses a button, takes a pill, enters a password, and gets a result, while he knows the link between the action and the result only from other people's words. Researchers call ritual a causally opaque action, one where it is known what to do and unknown why it works [20, p. 152]. Like our button. Behind it stands knowledge possessed by someone else, but we do not check it ourselves and act because we believe. Let us call this everyday magic. The primeval way of acting has stayed with us; only the objects have changed.

For society this is an enormous advantage, because each generation uses the experience of the previous ones. But errors are passed down by the same path.

Here again the limitations of human thinking make themselves felt. A person believes the word of an authority more readily than the same word from a stranger. A conviction shared by the majority seems to him truer, and an explanation he has heard many times more plausible.

This is how shared ideas that no one has checked spread. Some of them help people act in concert, some entrench mistaken practices, and all of them determine real deeds.

Advertising and the Management of Desire

In the prologue we proposed to view advertising as the transmission of information that the recipient did not ask for. For that reason alone, advertising is a convenient place to study the human will.

A person is going about their business when a message breaks into their field of attention, a message that another person created with a clear purpose. The sender expects it to change the person's attitude toward some object and their future behavior.

At first glance, it is all simple. The seller announces that a product exists. The buyer learns its properties, weighs its cost against its usefulness, and makes a decision. But the psychology of consumption is more complicated.

We have already found that an object acquires meaning within individual experience and within the space of culture. A person evaluates the same information differently depending on how it is presented. The research of Kahneman and Tversky applies to advertising directly [12, ch. 11, pp. 159–171; ch. 34, pp. 474–492].

Imagine a product on sale. The buyer sees the old price and the new one, and the old price becomes the point of reference. The product itself has stayed the same, yet it has become more attractive.

Another example concerns framing. You can say of one and the same product how much good is in it, or you can say how much bad. In Kahneman's example it is a cold cut whose package labeled "90% fat free" appeals more than one labeled "10% fat," although the product is the same [12, ch. 7, pp. 107–119].

But advertising works beyond cognitive biases, too. Most often it relies on ideas that already exist in the culture.

Imagine a car. Its practical function is to carry people. But for a particular person it can display a level of personal freedom or point to a position in society. Advertising ties a specific model to the ideas of status that have formed in its audience.

This is how Romanov's theory of the potential text of culture unfolds in advertising [30, pp. 118–119]. The communication message makes use of existing expectations of meaning and joins the object to a cultural image.

In advertising practice there is a working word for this work: insight. Behind it stands the following construction: 1) the person has a desire or a task, 2) the world imposes a limitation: strength runs short, the situation is awkward, fear or embarrassment gets in the way. The insight connects this collision with the possibility that the product offers. The result is a scheme of volition in miniature: an impulse, an obstacle, and an action that removes the obstacle.

Let us give three examples from practice.

Since 2010, Snickers has built its advertising on the formula "You're not you when you're hungry" [39]. The property of the product is that it satisfies hunger. The message, however, speaks of how hunger is experienced: a person becomes irritable, loses concentration and attention, as if reborn as someone else, someone entirely the opposite of themselves. Because when you are hungry, you cannot stay true to the goal you have set; you will keep returning to the thought of hunger. The cultural support is everyday knowledge, fixed in sayings like "hunger is no aunt": a hungry person behaves differently from a full one.

Apple presented the first iPod in 2001 like this: a thousand songs in your pocket. The press release stated gigabytes as well, but the storage capacity was at once translated into a gesture: "put it in your pocket." It also promised that the music would not skip from shaking when a person runs or rides a bicycle [37]. The advertising unfolded this in the cultural code of breakdancing, which was impossible to dance to with a CD player. A technical parameter is explained through movement of the body. The viewer reads the product's unmanifested possibility the way a child discovers the properties of a chair, through the action that the object allows one to perform.

In 1960 Volkswagen printed a photograph of the Beetle with a single word, "Lemon" [38]. In American usage this is what a defective car is called. The reader expects a confession of a defect, and the text explains: the inspector, Kurt Kroner, rejected this car because of a flaw in the chrome strip of the glove compartment. The word sets off an expectation prepared by the culture, and the ad turns that expectation to the brand's advantage. This is how the potential text works when a symbol calls up a long chain of associations that the reader completes on their own.

In all three cases the message ties the product to an existing desire and a familiar obstacle. When the connection hits the mark, the person begins to see in the thing a way to get what they want.

And then the question arises of whether advertising has created a new desire. The answer depends on what one counts as a desire. A person may have long been striving for recognition, and advertising only offered a new way to achieve it. But it could also have painted for them a new image of the desired life, and then advertising is already changing cultural meanings. Rubinstein, following Marx, answers directly: "By producing objects of consumption, production thereby also produces the corresponding needs in the subject" [8, ch. XVII, section "Needs"]. A new thing brings a new need with it, and a person most often learns about the thing from advertising.

This does not make advertising an all-powerful instrument for managing people. A person evaluates a message according to their own circumstances. Their needs may diverge from the image on offer, and personal experience may make an advertising promise unconvincing. Besides, a promise is always tested, because communication creates an expectation, and the encounter with the product either confirms it or destroys it. In marketing these are called moments of truth. Procter & Gamble's chief, A. G. Lafley, counted two: the first comes at the shelf, when the buyer chooses a brand, the second at home, when she uses it, "and is delighted or not" (quoted in [46, p. 11]).

Studies of cognitive biases describe behavior on average and under conditions of experience. They cannot be used to predict the decision of an individual person.

And yet advertising works with mechanisms of the psyche that the consumer himself most often does not notice.

Hence the parallel with magic and religion. Magic promises a result and requires that one first perform an action, and the promise cannot be checked in advance. Advertising works in exactly the same way. A person is offered something to buy, and the purchase is supposed to bring about what they desire.

A religious teaching ties the prescribed actions to an idea of salvation, and an advertising message ties a purchase to an idea of a desired state. In both cases the future result exists in the mind of the recipient and acquires value for them.

True, in the first case it is a matter of a goal that lies beyond the bounds of reality. In the second, of a product or service that can be bought. The historical tasks of religious and advertising institutions are different. That is why for now we speak only of a likeness of psychological mechanisms.

In both cases a cultural idea influences human activity, and therefore the likeness calls for our investigation.

To Whom Our Will Belongs

So, a human being is a living organism whose initial state is movement: it acts outward and receives a response. The action is given; the person chooses its direction — this is what we called volition.

The person chooses from what is given to them, because values and goals took shape in culture long before their birth. And the mind hurries, sees a cause in a chance coincidence, and takes the habitual for the obvious.

Our will always exists within conditions we did not choose. But by understanding them, a person widens the space of possible actions. They notice a habit and change it, and set themselves a rule for the sake of a distant goal.

The first chapter ended with a question: where does a person get the capacity to want one thing and do another when no one is forcing them? Now we can answer. Desire arises on its own. A need inevitably comes from the body, and its object is suggested by the culture in which the person grew up. An act, unlike a desire, can be prepared in advance, if one makes a decision and promises others to carry it out. The hungry hunter with whom we began the chapter wants to eat the kill himself and yet shares it, because he took on his obligation to the community long before he became hungry.

One more problem remains. To decide, a person often lacks knowledge of their own, and they make use of ideas that they cannot check themselves.

Much they accept on the word of other people or complete on their own, connecting events with one another. Furthest from verification stand ideas about a reality that lies beyond experience.

Hence the next question of our book. How does a person come to regard an unverified idea as true and to act on it?

For this they will need faith. And together with faith they will be able to turn a personal idea of the invisible into a conviction that others share. In time such convictions will take stable forms, be passed from generation to generation, and become the basis of common action.

This is how we approach the emergence of religion. And at the same time one of the main questions of our study.

If a person acts for the sake of an imagined result, and their desires and ideas take shape within culture, then enormous power goes to whoever knows how to influence those ideas.

The history of religion and advertising will show how humankind learned to make use of it.

Published November 17, 2026. The text may be revised before the book appears.

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